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(SOME) MOTHERS KNOW BEST: 
A CASE COMMENT ON M.M. v. T.B. 
AND THE PLIGHT OF INDIGENOUS 





Over time, courts have come to acknowledge the 
significance of Indigenous identity when deciding custody 
disputes, but they continue to struggle with how much 
consideration should be given to the broader history 
involved, which can leave Indigenous mothers particularly 
disadvantaged in family law proceedings. Not only do 
Indigenous mothers have to contend with the law’s general 
assumptions and expectations about mothers, they also 
have to endure the courts’ often limited ability to situate 
mothers’ individual actions in the wider context of 
structural barriers erected by government and societal 
forces. A close examination of the recent British Columbia 
Court of Appeal decision in M.M. v. T.B. provides a useful 
example of the challenges that Indigenous mothers can 
face, as well as the competing interests that courts must 
balance in these circumstances. 
                                                     
  BA (College of Arts & Sciences at the University of Pennsylvania), JD 
(Peter A. Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia). 
First, I would like to acknowledge that I live and learn on the 
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Parkes—I would like to thank her for all her generous guidance and 
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provided invaluable feedback on an earlier draft. 





Family law is unsurprisingly fraught with tension between 
the parties and strong emotional investment in the 
outcomes of disputes. When children are present, this 
situation is complicated even further. One additional 
element that courts are continuously attempting to navigate 
is Indigenous identity and its impact on determining a 
child’s best interests. Over time, courts have come to 
acknowledge the significance of Indigenous identity when 
deciding custody disputes, but they continue to struggle 
with how much consideration should be given to the 
broader history involved, which can leave Indigenous 
mothers particularly disadvantaged in family law 
proceedings. Not only do Indigenous mothers have to 
contend with the law’s general assumptions and 
expectations about mothers, they also have to endure the 
courts’ often limited ability to situate mothers’ individual 
actions in the wider context of structural barriers erected by 
government and societal forces. A close examination of the 
recent British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in M.M. 
v. T.B.1 provides a useful example of the challenges that 
Indigenous mothers can face, as well as the competing 







                                                     
1  MM v TB, 2017 BCCA 296, 100 BCLR (5th) 286. 










On December 31, 2006, T.B. gave birth to R when she was 
20 years old.2 She had struggled with addiction for many 
years, and after cocaine was discovered in R’s bloodstream 
when he was born, he was immediately taken into care by 
the Ministry of Children and Family Development. Two 
days later, R’s maternal grandmother, B.B., applied for 
sole custody of R. T.B. supported her application and, five 
months later in 2007, B.B. was granted sole custody and 
guardianship of R. 
 
B.B., her husband N.K., T.B., and R are all 
members of the Splatsin Band, which is part of the 
Shuswap Nation.3 B.B. was suffering from poor health and 
depression, so in 2008 the Band arranged for M.M. and 
R.M. to provide assistance with caring for R and for T.B.’s 
first born, M.I., who was also in B.B.’s care. M.M. is a 
member of the Songhees First Nation and R.M. is not 
Indigenous; they had no children of their own but were 
interested in adopting Indigenous children. After B.B. met 
with M.M. and R.M. and agreed that they were suitable 
caregivers, they began taking care of R and M.I. on 
                                                     
2  The facts in this section have been summarized from the trial decision: 
British Columbia Birth Registration No XX-XX297 (Re), 2015 BCSC 
1577, 71 RFL (7th) 432 at paras 6–31 [BC Birth Registration]. 
3  Note that the trial judge refers to the “Shuswap” Nation while the Court 
of Appeal refers to the “Secwepemc” Nation. “The Secwepemc People 
[are] known by non-natives as the Shuswap” (Secwepemc Cultural 
Education Society, Our Story (Kamloops), online: 
<http://www.secwepemc.org/our-story.html>). 
    CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018] 
 
182 
weekends. In late 2008, B.B. asked M.M. and R.M. to take 
care of R full time for a few months and, with the Band’s 
approval and funding, the couple began to do so. In 2009, 
B.B. asked the couple to keep R.4 They agreed, and by the 
end of that year the Band had made its last payment and 
ceased to be involved. 
 
For the next three years, B.B. visited R and the M 
family approximately every two months. During that time, 
T.B. made around seven to ten visits to R, which were 
always supervised by M.M. and R.M. T.B. was in and out 
of jail and continued to struggle with addiction until 2011, 
when she made significant changes in her life. That 
summer, B.B. began having overnight visits with R, and in 
August she requested all of his identification so that she 
could take him on an overnight trip across the border. After 
B.B. and T.B. refused to return R as promised, M.M. and 
R.M. applied for and were granted sole interim custody and 
guardianship of R, as well as a restraining and non-
communication order against B.B. and T.B. Ten days later, 
R was removed from B.B. and T.B.’s care by the police. 
They have not seen him since that day in 2011. 
 
Over the next year, T.B. and B.B. began and 
abandoned a number of applications to regain custody and 
guardianship of R. M.M. and R.M. made repeated offers 
for supervised visits, but B.B. and T.B. did not accept. The 
couple commenced a proceeding in 2012 seeking to adopt 
                                                     
4  BB strongly denied that she had placed R for customary adoption with 
MM and RM, but the trial judge ultimately found that BB did indeed 
make such a request. See BC Birth Registration, supra note 2 at paras 
16 and 35–47. 






R, contrary to the wishes of B.B., T.B., and the Splatsin 
Band. 
 
THE TRIAL DECISION 
 
There were three main issues at trial:5 
 
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction to make an 
adoption order when the petitioners have not 
met some of the requirements of the Adoption 
Act?6 
2. If so, should the birth mother’s consent be 
dispensed with and is the adoption in R’s best 
interest? 
3. If the adoption order is not made, should the 
respondents be awarded guardianship of R? 
 
In regard to issue one, Madam Justice Fenlon 
concluded that there is a gap in the Adoption Act. She 
determined that this was “an appropriate case to exercise 
the parens patriae jurisdiction of the Court to fill the gap 
in the legislation and to consider the petitioners’ 
application for adoption despite the absence of pre- and 
post-placement reports and notices”.7  
 
The second issue was the heart of the case and 
centered on a careful review of section three of the 
Adoption Act: 
 
                                                     
5  BC Birth Registration, supra note 2 at para 4. 
6  Adoption Act, RSBC 1996, c 5. 
7  BC Birth Registration, supra note 2 at para 77. 
    CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 31, 2018] 
 
184 
Best interests of child8  
3  (1)  All relevant factors must be considered in 
determining the child's best interests, 
including for example: 
  
(a)  the child's safety;  
(b)  the child's physical and emotional 
needs and level of development;  
(c)  the importance of continuity in the 
child's care;  
(d)  the importance to the child's 
development of having a positive 
relationship with a parent and a secure 
place as a member of a family;  
(e)  the quality of the relationship the 
child has with a parent or other 
individual and the effect of 
maintaining that relationship;  
(f)  the child's cultural, racial, linguistic 
and religious heritage;  
(g)  the child's views;  
(h)  the effect on the child if there is delay 
in making a decision.  
 
(2)  If the child is an aboriginal child, the 
importance of preserving the child's cultural 
identity must be considered in determining 
the child's best interests. 
                                                     
8  Adoption Act, supra note 6, s 3. 






After considering the test for determining the best 
interests of the child;9 the psychologist’s assessment that R 
had bonded completely with M.M., R.M., and their other 
two adopted Indigenous children;10 the M family’s ability 
to teach R about his Indigenous heritage;11 and R’s own 
wishes,12 Madam Justice Fenlon decided “that it is in R’s 
best interest to remain with and to be adopted by the 
petitioners, with access to T.B.” in the form of three 
supervised visits per year.13 
 
Next, Madam Justice Fenlon looked to see if T.B.’s 
consent to the adoption should be dispensed with, and she 
found that of the possible reasons under section 17 of the 
Adoption Act, section 17(1)(d) was the applicable 
provision: “other circumstances justify dispensing with the 
consent”.14 In concluding that it was in R’s best interest to 
dispense with T.B.’s consent to the adoption, Madam 
Justice Fenlon emphasized the lack of a meaningful parent-
child relationship between T.B. and R, as well as R’s own 




                                                     
9  BC Birth Registration, supra note 2 at para 80. 
10  Ibid at para 82. 
11  Ibid at paras 84–86. 
12  Ibid at para 91. 
13  Ibid at paras 92, 103. 
14  Ibid at paras 97–98. 
15  Ibid at paras 100–01. 
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THE APPEAL DECISION  
 
T.B. did not challenge Madam Justice Fenlon’s findings of 
fact, and “[t]he single ground of appeal [she] advanced . . . 
is that the judge erred in law by failing to correctly 
interpret, and therefore to properly weigh, the s[ection] 
3(2) factor”.16 In particular, T.B. submitted that “while the 
judge considered the child’s Aboriginal heritage and the 
importance of preserving his cultural identity in general, 
she erred in failing to specifically consider the 
‘ameliorative’ purpose of s[ection] 3(2)”.17 Although the 
statutory interpretation of section 3(2) was not raised at 
trial, the Court of Appeal addressed and ultimately rejected 
this argument, explaining that when “determining whether 
an adoption order should be made, a child’s Aboriginal 
heritage and cultural identity does not attract a ‘super-
weight’ over the other factors”.18 The Court concluded that 
such an expanded interpretation was not supported by the 
text of the statute, and that the trial judge made no error in 
regard to section 3(2) because “[t]he evidence 
overwhelmingly supported her decision that making the 
adoption order was in the best interests of the child”.19 In 
addition to dismissing the appeal, the Court clarified the 
analysis from another British Columbia Court of Appeal 
judgment, which was rendered in 2016 and concerned the 
                                                     
16  MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 11. 
17  Ibid at para 12. 
18  Ibid at para 15. 
19  Ibid at para 96. 











M.M. v. T.B. vividly illustrates the disadvantages and 
obstacles that Indigenous mothers can encounter in child 
welfare and adoption proceedings. Explicitly and 
implicitly in both the trial judge’s decision and the Court 
of Appeal’s decision are references to the difficult 
circumstances against which T.B. and B.B. struggled—
circumstances that were not solely the result of their 
individual choices, but rather situations linked to a much 
broader and heavier context. However, the judgments—
particularly the judgment from the Court of Appeal—do 
not fully acknowledge that T.B. and B.B. were not wholly 
and personally responsible for the conditions that led to R’s 
adoption. The object of this paper is not to prove that it was, 
in fact, in R’s best interests to stay with T.B. and B.B. 
Instead, the aim is to highlight the Courts’ failure to explore 
T.B. and B.B.’s identities as Indigenous mothers, whose 
lives have therefore been fundamentally impacted by 
colonialism and racial oppression. 
 
THE DOMINANT IDEOLOGY OF MOTHERHOOD 
 
A helpful starting point for effectively analyzing and 
understanding the key issues arising out of the case is 
Professor Marlee Kline’s renowned 1993 article entitled 
“Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood: Child Welfare 
                                                     
20  Ibid at para 61. The Court reviewed the analysis in LM v British 
Columbia (Director of Child, Family and Community Services), 2016 
BCCA 367, 89 BCLR (5th) 362. 
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Law and First Nation Women”.21 Professor Kline 
discussed the meaning and implications of “the dominant 
ideology of motherhood”, which she described as:  
 
. . . the constellation of ideas and images in 
western capitalist societies that constitute the 
dominant ideals of motherhood against which 
women’s lives are judged. The expectations 
established by these ideals limit and shape the 
choices women make in their lives, and 
construct the dominant criteria of ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ mothering. They exist within a 
framework of dominant ideologies of 
womanhood, which, in turn, intersect with 
dominant ideologies of family.22  
 
Motherhood is viewed as the natural and desired 
goal for women.23 They are expected to embrace primary 
responsibility for their children and operate as part of a 
heterosexual, nuclear, patriarchal family.24 If mothers 
deviate from the ideals of motherhood, they are 
characterized as bad mothers, “thereby justifying their 
social and legal regulation, including regulation by child 
welfare law”.25 Unfortunately, Indigenous mothers are 
especially vulnerable to being marked as bad mothers and 
                                                     
21  Marlee Kline, “Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood: Child 
Welfare Law and First Nation Women” (1993) 18:2 Queen’s LJ 306. 
22  Ibid at 310 [emphasis added]. 
23  Ibid. 
24  Ibid at 310–11. 
25  Ibid at 312. 






losing custody of their children.26 Although Professor 
Kline’s article is over 20 years old, it provides a revealing 
lens with which to review M.M. v. T.B. The case, in turn, 
offers an opportunity to assess whether the law has moved 
in a more positive direction since the article’s publication.  
 
More recent scholarship in the area of child welfare 
law demonstrates how Professor Kline’s analysis continues 
to be a relevant and appropriate tool for studying cases such 
as M.M. v. T.B. In 2013, Professor Susan Boyd wrote that 
“[b]ecause ideological expectations have shifted over time, 
any clear dichotomy between good and bad mothers is now 
difficult to sustain”.27 For instance, “equality has become a 
dominant norm”, and fathers are more engaged with their 
children’s lives than they once were.28 Nevertheless, she 
argued that “motherhood remains an institution that 
contributes to women’s systematic inequality”,29 and 
“[m]others who are already marginalized, notably as a 
result of poverty, race or aboriginality, are most vulnerable 
to being labelled ‘unfit’”.30 Similarly, a recent examination 
of how courts in British Columbia adjudicate applications 
by the state to permanently remove children from their 
mothers found that, in the cases that were reviewed, “the 
most dominant theme . . . is that women are blamed and 
                                                     
26  Ibid at 340. 
27  Susan B Boyd, “Motherhood and Law: Constructing and Challenging 
Normativity” in Vanessa E Munro & Margaret Davies, eds, The 
Ashgate Research Companion to Feminist Legal Theory (Farnham: 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2013) 267 at 271. 
28  Ibid. 
29  Ibid at 280. 
30  Ibid at 269. 
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found responsible for the desperate social circumstances in 
which they find themselves”.31 The dire situations 
described in these decisions were “often related to poverty, 
mental disability/addiction, homelessness, male violence, 
the intergenerational impact of the child protection system, 
and the tragic legacy of residential schools and the removal 
of Indigenous children from their families”.32 
 
From the opening paragraphs of both the trial and 
appeal decisions, it is evident that T.B. is someone who has 
not adhered to the dominant ideology of motherhood. In 
contrast, R’s adoptive mother, M.M., largely meets the 
supposed criteria of a good mother according to the 
ideology. Rather than accepting motherhood as her 
ultimate objective, T.B. lost custody of her son when he 
was born, after which she supported the child’s 
grandmother in her application to become his primary 
caregiver instead.33 She also allowed M.M. and R.M. to 
take over this role later on, and failed to maximize her 
opportunities to visit R.34 Furthermore, R’s biological 
father was not involved in his life,35 and prior to R’s birth, 
T.B. had already surrendered her first born child to her 
parents’ custody.36 By comparison, M.M. had been married 
to R.M. for 22 years at the time of the trial, and she was 
                                                     
31  Judith Mosoff et al, “Intersecting Challenges: Mothers and Child 
Protection Law in BC” (2017) 50:2 UBC L Rev 435 at 501. 
32  Ibid. 
33  BC Birth Registration, supra note 2 at paras 6–7.  
34  Ibid at para 19. 
35  MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 5. 
36  BC Birth Registration, supra note 2 at para 6 and 22. 






eager to bring children into her life.37 She and her husband 
adopted another boy and girl, meaning R would be joining 
a quintessential family unit where he would have two 
parents and siblings.38 
 
M.M.’s ability to care for and love R is not in dispute, but 
the Courts do not adequately reflect on the factors that may 
have prevented T.B. from wanting or trying to do the same 
in R’s earliest years. T.B.’s deviation from the expectations 
demanded by the dominant ideology of motherhood are not 
specifically recognized as being the consequence of a 
longer narrative. For example, the trial decision mentions 
in one line that T.B.’s mother, B.B., had her own 
experiences with the child welfare law system, when “the 
Band’s social workers removed some of B.B.’s and N.K.’s 
children from their care”.39 At some point in the past, B.B. 
was also categorized as an unfit mother; this is an event that 
adds another dimension to T.B. and B.B.’s personal 
histories, since “[t]he effects of child welfare involvement 
are felt multi-generationally”.40 The Courts’ decisions 
regarding R, however, do not make enough room to 
consider the reasons beyond B.B. and T.B.’s control for 
why they found themselves in a position where the state 
felt that intervening in their lives was justified. As 
                                                     
37  Ibid at para 12. 
38  Ibid at para 82. 
39  Ibid at para 10. 
40  Pivot Legal Society, Broken Promises: Parents Speak about BC's 
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Professor Kline observed, by presenting the expectations 
that constitute good mothering as “natural, necessary, and 
universal”, bad mothering is constructed as the opposite, 
“with the operation of racism and other such factors 
rendered invisible. Moreover, the realities of poverty, 
racism, heterosexism, and violence that often define the 
lives of mothers who do not conform to the ideology are 
effectively erased.”41 In M.M. v. T.B., the erasure takes 
place when the Court neglects to connect T.B. and B.B.’s 
individual problems to the surrounding colonial context. 
 
THE LONG SHADOW OF COLONIALISM 
 
A quarter of a century after Professor Kline’s article was 
published, the devastating impact of colonial oppression on 
Indigenous peoples can still be seen in every aspect of 
society. For instance, in 2015-16 Indigenous adults 
accounted for 26 percent of admissions to provincial and 
territorial correctional services, despite representing about 
3 percent of the Canadian adult population.42 Indigenous 
peoples are also “disproportionately homeless and 
inadequately housed”,43 less likely to graduate from high 
                                                     
41  Kline, supra note 21 at 315 [emphasis added]. 
42  Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Statistics in Canada, 2015/2016 
(Statistics Canada, 2017), online: <www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-
x/2017001/article/14700-eng.htm> [Statistics Canada, Adult 
Correctional Statistics]. 
43  Carly Patrick, Aboriginal Homelessness in Canada: A Literature 
Review (Toronto: Canadian Homelessness Research Network Press, 
2014) at 10, online: 
<www.homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/AboriginalLiteratureReview
.pdf>. 






school,44 and at particular risk for substance abuse and 
addiction compared to the non-Indigenous population.45 In 
addition, Indigenous women generally fare even worse 
than Indigenous men. Overrepresentation in admissions to 
provincial and territorial correctional services is more 
pronounced for Indigenous women than for their male 
counterparts,46 and “there are disproportionately more 
Indigenous women . . . living in poverty and facing hunger 
and homelessness”.47 These facts are a backdrop for the 
challenges that B.B. and T.B. encountered as Indigenous 
mothers. 
 
The Court of Appeal noted that T.B. “struggled 
with addiction issues and lived on the street between the 
ages of 17 and 24. During that time, she was in and out of 
jail for various matters”.48 T.B.’s difficult journey cannot 
be divorced from the barriers facing Indigenous peoples as 
                                                     
44  Statistics Canada, Aboriginal Victimization in Canada: A Summary of 
the Literature (Statistics Canada, 2017), online: 
<www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/victim/rd3-rr3/p3.html>. 
45  Library of Parliament, Current Issues in Mental Health in Canada: 
Directions in Federal Substance Abuse Policy (Parliamentary 
Information and Research Service, 2014) at 2.2.1.2, online: 
<https://lop.parl.ca/sites/PublicWebsite/default/en_CA/ResearchPubli
cations/201406E>. 
46  Statistics Canada, Adult Correctional Statistics, supra note 42. 
47  Dawn Memee Lavell-Harvard & Jeannette Corbiere Lavell, “What 
More Do You People Want? The Unique Needs of Aboriginal Mothers 
in a Modern Context” in Andrea O’Reilly, ed, What Do Mothers Need? 
Motherhood Activists and Scholars Speak Out on Maternal 
Empowerment for the 21st Century (Bradford, ON: Demeter Press, 
2012) 107 at 107. 
48  MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 16. 
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a whole, but the judgment does not acknowledge how her 
addiction, homelessness, and incarceration were tied to a 
broader picture. While the Court does not engage in overt 
mother-blaming of the type Professor Kline identified in 
her article,49 the omission of context for T.B.’s 
circumstances still implies that she failed to be a suitable 
mother, when in fact the odds were stacked against her 
from the beginning. Similarly, when M.M. and R.M. began 
providing weekend respite care for R, it was because B.B. 
was experiencing what the Court of Appeal called “health 
problems”.50 The trial decision is more specific and 
transparent: B.B. was simultaneously caring for R and 
T.B.’s first born child, and she was “suffering from poor 
health and depression at that time”.51 These details allow 
connections to be drawn between B.B.’s individual need 
for assistance and the obstacles facing Indigenous peoples, 
who are more likely to experience physical and mental 
illness than non-Indigenous people.52 Unfortunately, the 
trial judge does not explicitly make the link between B.B.’s 
health troubles and the disadvantages plaguing Indigenous 
communities. 
 
                                                     
49  See e.g. Kline, supra note 21 at 321. 
50  MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 18. 
51  BC Birth Registration, supra note 2 at para 11. 
52  See Naomi Adelson, “The Embodiment of Inequity: Health Disparities 
in Aboriginal Canada” (2005) 96:2 Can J Public Health 45 & see 
Laurence J Kirmayer, Gregory M Brass & Caroline L Tait, “The 
Mental Health of Aboriginal Peoples: Transformations of Identity and 
Community” (2000) 45:7 Can J Psychiatry 607. 






THE LACK OF FOCUS ON BIG PICTURE 
SOLUTIONS 
 
In making her determination that it would be in R’s best 
interests to be adopted by M.M. and R.M., and that the 
Court should dispense with T.B.’s consent, Madam Justice 
Fenlon wrote that “there is in this case effectively no 
existing parent-child relationship between T.B. and R”.53  
It can be argued, however, that the state’s actions—or 
rather, lack of actions—played a significant role in 
jeopardizing the parent-child relationship between mother 
and son from the outset. 
 
In her article, Professor Kline observed that “[c]hild 
protection workers are directed to identify and design 
treatment for the problematic behaviours of individual 
caregivers, not to document and develop responses to 
problems of poverty, racism, and violence, and the way 
these affect women’s lives”.54 More than 20 years later, 
government focus on addressing larger, overarching 
problems remains deficient. The reality is still that “more 
attention needs to be paid to the possibility of support 
systems that might allow more mothers to be parents to 
their children”.55 In 2008, Pivot Legal Society published a 
report on the child welfare system in British Columbia and 
the inadequacies of current child protection practices, 
despite legislative reform and other changes.56 One of the 
report’s conclusions was that: 
                                                     
53  BC Birth Registration, supra note 2 at para 100. 
54  Kline, supra note 21 at 320 [emphasis in original; footnote omitted]. 
55  Mosoff et al, supra note 31 at 502. 
56  Pivot Legal Society, supra note 40. 




Approaches to protecting children remain 
individualistic, crisis driven and devoid of a 
real commitment to supporting universal 
public programs that would reduce poverty 
and the social and economic stresses on all 
parents. Although the colonial history of this 
province and ongoing discrimination against 
Aboriginal people are well recognized, 
comprehensive attempts to address the 
economic, social and cultural impacts of this 
legacy have not been forthcoming.57 
 
Furthermore, the 2015 Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada’s 94 calls to action illustrate the 
breadth of areas in which more work is required to 
ameliorate the harms caused by the residential school 
system.58 The first section features five calls to action that 
concern child welfare, including a call for “the federal, 
provincial, territorial, and Aboriginal governments to 
develop culturally appropriate parenting programs for 
Aboriginal families”.59 The state’s unwillingness so far to 
prioritize solutions that target the consequences of colonial 
oppression has created conditions that enable desperate and 
tragic situations to arise. 
 
                                                     
57  Ibid at 119 [emphasis added]. 
58  Canada, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Calls to 
Action (Winnipeg: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 
2015). 
59  Ibid at number 5. 






In M.M. v. T.B., the facts highlight how issues such 
as T.B.’s addiction and B.B.’s health troubles were dealt 
with reactively, as problems appeared; had there been 
greater effort in the past by the state to invest in and 
implement meaningful programs aimed at improving the 
circumstances of Indigenous peoples, T.B. may have been 
more ready and capable of caring for R when he was born. 
Instead, when cocaine was discovered in R’s system at 
birth, he was removed from T.B.’s custody and “[h]e 
remained in the Ministry’s care for five months” until B.B. 
was able to obtain legal custody and guardianship of her 
grandson.60 Time and money were used to remove R from 
T.B., and to resolve B.B.’s application to gain custody of 
him, when perhaps those resources would have been better 
spent on tackling the root issues. Dr. Dawn Memee Lavell-
Harvard and Dr. Jeannette Corbiere Lavell wrote that 
“[a]lthough billions of dollars are allocated each year for 
programs and support services, clearly the funding 
allocations and priorities have failed to acknowledge, much 
less actually address, the unique needs of Aboriginal 
women in a modern context”.61 They argued that, in light 
of how Indigenous women are disproportionately 
marginalized, “rather than continuing to funnel money into 
social assistance programs, child welfare agencies, 
correction systems, and emergency shelters, targeted 
funding is necessary to provide Aboriginal women with 
sufficient personal safety and appropriate social supports” 
so that they are empowered to care for their families and 
themselves.62  
                                                     
60  See MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 6. 
61  Lavell-Harvard & Corbiere Lavell, supra note 47 at 107. 
62  Ibid at 119. 




“In 2013, after the commencement of the 
underlying adoption proceeding, [T.B.] deposed that she 
had been clean and sober for two years”,63 but by that point 
her son had already lived with M.M. and R.M. for several 
years. The relationship had been fundamentally changed. 
During the years of turmoil, when she struggled with 
addiction, homelessness, and incarceration, T.B. 
nonetheless visited R a handful of times and maintained a 
degree of connection.64 Despite successfully turning her 
life around later on, T.B. had already lost the “privilege” of 
motherhood.65 Had there been more effective support from 
the state earlier in her life, the situation could have been 
avoided altogether. Dr. Lavell-Harvard and Dr. Corbiere 
Lavell asserted that funding for better programs is “not 
only an investment in individual women”, but a venture 
that creates “ripples . . . in the larger communities”.66 The 
empowerment of Indigenous women “will generate 
stronger heathier families, improved circumstances for 
future generations of Aboriginal children and 
grandchildren, and ultimately stronger healthier Aboriginal 
communities”.67 
 
                                                     
63  MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 22. 
64  Ibid at para 21. 
65  See Kline, supra note 21 at 313 for her discussion of motherhood being 
better conceptualized as a “privilege that can be withheld” from 
mothers who have been labelled unfit, rather than as a right.  
66  Lavell-Harvard & Corbiere Lavell, supra note 47 at 119.  
67  Ibid. 






THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING 
INDIGENOUS IDENTITY 
 
As discussed above, Professor Kline’s article revealed that 
the first way in which the dominant ideology of 
motherhood affects Indigenous women in child welfare 
proceedings is by blaming them as individuals and 
obscuring the true roots of their difficulties: a long history 
of colonialism and oppression.68 She argued that the 
second impact of the ideology is that it “impose[s] 
dominant cultural values and practices relating to child care 
upon First Nations. Correspondingly, it devalues First 
Nations child care ethics and practices, as well as First 
Nation communities as places to raise children”.69  
 
Given that the reasons in M.M. v. T.B. are largely 
preoccupied with how much and how best to preserve R’s 
Indigenous heritage and cultural identity, Professor Kline’s 
second observation is perhaps an imperfect tool for 
analyzing this case. For example, she suggested that the 
dominant ideology of motherhood leads to insufficient 
recognition by the courts for collective child-raising 
methods; in Indigenous communities, collective child-
raising is a common approach where extended family 
members actively participate in caregiving.70 This is not a 
core issue in M.M. v. T.B. The suitability of B.B., R’s 
grandmother, assisting T.B. with his upbringing is not 
questioned, and indeed, M.M. and R.M. shared child-
raising responsibilities for R with B.B. prior to the 
                                                     
68  Kline, supra note 21 at 318. 
69  Ibid at 331. 
70  Ibid. 
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breakdown of their friendship.71 The problem is less that 
the trial judge and the Court of Appeal failed to appreciate 
the value of Indigenous identity and practices, and more 
that their actual understanding of Indigenous identity was 
flawed and incomplete. In the years since Professor Kline’s 
article was published, the courts have learned to show 
greater consideration for Indigenous culture, and the 
legislature has placed increased and explicit emphasis on 
respecting Indigenous heritage.72 M.M. v. T.B. is evidence 
that the need to preserve Indigenous identity receives 
attention from the courts, but the case also illustrates the 
shortcomings of the courts’ overall perspective on 
Indigenous culture, which can disadvantage Indigenous 
mothers in child welfare and adoption proceedings. 
 
At the Court of Appeal, counsel for T.B. raised a 
number of concerns about the trial judge’s account of 
Indigenous identity, arguing in particular that: 
. . . the judge’s observation that the 
respondent mother [M.M.] is Indigenous, and 
that the child can learn about First Nations 
through the respondents’ weekly activities 
with the child and his siblings at a First 
Nations association in their community, 
amounts to insufficient consideration of the 
s[ection] 3(2) factor as the child would not 
learn about the Secwepemc culture. Counsel 
submits that the judge’s observation is 
“indicative of an outdated and colonial 
                                                     
71  MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 18. BB was caring for R during the 
week, and MM and RM were caring for him over the weekends.  
72  See e.g. Adoption Act, supra note 6, s 3(2).  






characterization of all Indigenous Nations 
being alike, regardless of the differences 
among the 198 First Nations in British 
Columbia.”73  
It is troubling how comfortably the Court dismissed 
this critique. First, they noted that neither B.B. nor T.B. 
speaks the Shuswap language and that T.B.’s eldest 
daughter is teaching herself via the internet, but they did so 
in a noticeably less sensitive manner than the trial judge did 
in her decision.74 Madam Justice Fenlon commented that 
“it is sadly the case that the respondents [T.B. and B.B.] do 
not speak Shuswap either, other than a few words. N.K. 
attributed this to the removal of his generation to residential 
schools”.75 By not acknowledging the painful history 
underlying the loss of language, the Court of Appeal failed 
to appropriately recognize the gravity of T.B.’s argument.  
 
The Court also concluded that “the adoptive parents 
have done everything they could reasonably have done to 
ensure that the child learns about, participates in, and 
appreciates the significance of his Aboriginal heritage and 
culture. The evidence is clear that the child knows about 
his particular Band and First Nation, and speaks with pride 
about being Aboriginal”.76 As such, even if the Court 
agreed that section 3(2) deserves more weight than the 
other factors listed in section 3(1),77 M.M. and R.M.’s 
                                                     
73  MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 13 [emphasis added].  
74  Ibid at para 14. 
75  BC Birth Registration, supra note 2 at para 85.  
76  MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 15. 
77  Adoption Act, supra note 6. 
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actions still would have adequately preserved R’s cultural 
identity.78 Similarly, the trial judge emphasized that M.M. 
is Indigenous and therefore “well-able to maintain the 
contact between R and his First Nations heritage”.79 The 
trial judge listed evidence of M.M.’s extensive 
involvement with her community and highlighted the M 
family’s “weekly activities at the Lake Country Native 
Association, including smudging, drumming and 
powwows. . . . [M.M.] practic[es] First Nations spirituality 
at home, tell[s] traditional stories, and engag[es] in First 
Nations crafts and artwork”.80 The trial judge ultimately 
determined that “[w]hile, as Chief Christian testified, there 
are unique aspects of the Shuswap traditions, it is clear that 
there are also many similarities”.81  
 
Both the trial decision and the appeal decision seem 
to reveal a problematic willingness to accept that different 
First Nations are, to some degree, interchangeable. The 
Court of Appeal insisted that R’s knowledge of the Splatsin 
Band and Shuswap Nation are satisfactory, and that M.M. 
and R.M. did a perfectly reasonable job with teaching him, 
thereby implying that there is no need to consider whether 
a member of the Shuswap Nation may have had more 
insight to offer. The trial judge was even more blunt, 
concluding that there are plenty of similarities between 
Shuswap traditions and those of other First Nations. As a 
result, M.M. v. T.B. works to reinforce the harmful idea that 
all First Nations are one homogenous group. Contrary to 
                                                     
78  MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 15. 
79  BC Birth Registration, supra note 2 at para 84. 
80  Ibid. 
81  Ibid. 






the suggestion in the trial decision, different First Nations 
practice different spirituality, tell different traditional 
stories, and craft different artwork. It is vital that 
“Aboriginal people [be] . . . understood in their own 
contexts. Non-Aboriginal people often fail to understand 
the sheer diversity and multiplicity and shifting identities 
of Aboriginal people.”82 In Wrapping Our Ways Around 
Them: Aboriginal Communities and the Child, Family and 
Community Service Act (CFCSA) Guidebook, Ardith 
Walkem—a lawyer and member of the Nlaka'pamux 
Nation—wrote that “[e]fforts to maintain a child’s 
Aboriginal cultural heritage are often generic, reflecting a 
failure to understand the child’s unique cultural identity. . . 
. Pan-Aboriginal daycares, play groups or cultural events 
should not be read as sufficient”.83 The courts should be 
working to show greater respect for the diversity within the 
Indigenous population, and to acknowledge that each 
culture is distinctive and important. As Professor Hadley 
Friedland cautioned, there is a “difficulty [to] outside legal 
decision-makers, who are embedded in a context that has 
historically devalued Aboriginal peoples and culture, 
                                                     
82  Ute Lischke & David T McNab, eds, Walking a Tightrope: Aboriginal 
People and Their Representations (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 2005) at 1. 
83  Ardith Walkem, Wrapping Our Ways Around Them: Aboriginal 
Communities and the Child, Family and Community Service Act 
(CFCSA) Guidebook (ShchEma-mee.tkt Project, 2015) at 89. The 
Guidebook contains compelling recommendations for best practices 
and innovative solutions in the area of child welfare. 
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evaluating the cultural connections of Aboriginal 
children”.84 
 
The Chief of the Band and the Director of Band 
Services testified at trial that, “while [the Band] supported 
the child residing with the respondents [M.M. and R.M.], 
they were opposed to the respondents’ adoption of the child 
as in principle they opposed any adoption to persons 
outside of the Band.”85 The Band’s reluctance to support 
the new and permanent legal relationship that would be 
created by R’s adoption must be viewed in light of their 
history, but once again the Court of Appeal did not 
comment on context. The trial judge, at the very least, 
recognized that “[t]he Splatsin Band was decimated by the 
removal of children to residential schools and the ‘60s 
scoop,’ the adoption of Aboriginal children into Caucasian 
homes”.86 As Justice Belobaba stated in Brown v. Canada 
(Attorney General), “[t]here is . . . no dispute about the fact 
that great harm was done [by the Sixties Scoop]. The 
‘scooped’ children lost contact with their families. They 
lost their aboriginal language, culture and identity”.87 He 
added that “the loss of their aboriginal identity left the 
children fundamentally disoriented”.88 The absence of 
explicit appreciation that “historical injustices are a 
significant factor in [the Band’s] pursuit of R’s return to his 
                                                     
84  Hadley Friedland, “Tragic Choices and the Division of Sorrow: 
Speaking about Race, Culture and Community Traumatisation in the 
Lives of Children” (2009) 25:2 Can J Fam L 223 at 233. 
85  MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 38. 
86  BC Birth Registration, supra note 2 at para 9. 
87  2017 ONSC 251, 136 OR (3d) 497 at para 6. 
88  Ibid at para 7. 






birth family and community” in the Court of Appeal’s 
decision is unfortunate because these past wrongs are 
related to the Band’s specific identity and journey.89 If 
Indigenous cultures are essentially the same, as M.M. v. 
T.B. inappropriately implies, then Indigenous mothers are 
even more disadvantaged in adoption proceedings, as it is 
therefore easier to discount the need for the mother to be a 
link to a particular First Nation. 
 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
 
The Court of Appeal accepted that “the child has no sense 
of loss about not being with his biological family”.90 R’s 
contentment with his adopted parents and siblings is 
unsurprising, given that he has resided with M.M. and R.M. 
since he was less than two years old. However, the 
possibility remains that he will experience repercussions 
later in his life. As Professor Raven Sinclair noted, 
“[a]djustment to adoption in Aboriginal children appears to 
deteriorate as the children get older, with a reported 
adoption breakdown rate of 85% (McKenzie and Hudson, 
1985) with Adams (2002) noting that rate is as high as 
95%”.91 Professor Sinclair was writing about “transracial 
                                                     
89  BC Birth Registration, supra note 2 at para 9. 
90  MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 34. 
91  Raven Sinclair, “Identity Lost and Found: Lessons from the Sixties 
Scoop” (2007) 3:1 First Peoples Child & Fam Rev 65 at 69 citing B 
McKenzie & P Hudson, “Native Children, Child Welfare and the 
Colonization of Native People” in Kenneth Levitt & Brian Wharf, eds, 
The Challenge of Child Welfare (The University of British Columbia 
Press, 1985) at 245 & citing Marie Adams, Our Son a Stranger: 
Adoption Breakdown and Its Effects on Parents (Quebec: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2002) at xxvii. 
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adoption” specifically—“adoption of a child from one 
ethnic group into another ethnic group”92—but her 
observations may nonetheless be relevant, given that M.M. 
belongs to a different First Nation than R and R.M. is not 
Indigenous at all. Complications and harm that are not 
immediately apparent may manifest in the future. 
 
Despite the logical and laudable rationale behind 
prioritizing the child’s best interests, there are also other 
losses resulting from R’s adoption that merit at least some 
attention. As Professor Friedland argued, “the best interests 
of Aboriginal children are inseparable from the best 
interests of their community, and . . . their individual losses 
are equally inseparable from the larger community’s 
losses. . . . [I]n the imperfect present, our concerns over one 
type of loss must not silence or subordinate our concern 
over another.”93 Considering the long history of 
colonialism and racial oppression of Indigenous peoples, 
as well as the role that child removal has played throughout 
the years, decisions such as M.M. v. T.B. have a deep 
impact on communities as a whole. Furthermore, as 
Professor Mosoff and her colleagues observed in their 
article, “[i]deologically, mothers’ rights are often 
constructed as oppositional to the rights of their children, 
which undermines the connection that exists between 
them”.94 Rather than conceptualizing child welfare 
proceedings as situations that mothers must lose so that 
their children may triumph, the legal system should work 
                                                     
92  Ibid at 65. 
93  Friedland, supra note 84 at 225–26 [emphasis in original; footnotes 
omitted]. 
94  Mosoff et al, supra note 31 at 440. 






on understanding how their interests interact, and how they 
both affect the broader community’s wellbeing. 
 
In her decision, the trial judge included a reference 
to Racine v. Woods, a case from the Supreme Court of 
Canada.95 As part of her reasoning for why the adoption 
order should be granted, Madam Justice Fenlon drew on 
the point from Racine that the “significance of cultural 
background and heritage as opposed to bonding abates over 
time. The closer the bond that develops with the 
prospective adoptive parents the less important the racial 
element becomes.”96 Counsel for T.B. submitted that 
Racine is outdated and “demonstrate[s] a lack of 
understanding of the importance of Indigenous culture to 
Indigenous children”, but the Court of Appeal rejected this 
claim, holding that Racine was still good law and that the 
comment used by the trial judge is “simply a matter of 
common sense”.97 In doing so, the Court of Appeal 
affirmed a disappointingly unthoughtful view of the 
relationship between Indigenous children and Indigenous 
communities. Not only is a diminishing awareness of 
Indigenous identity, in fact, very consequential for a child, 
it also has a serious effect on the community that has lost 
that child. Ardith Walkem noted that “Aboriginal 
communities have consistently argued that the Racine 
analysis fails to adequately or fully reflect the life-long 
importance of cultural identity and connections”.98 In 
                                                     
95  BC Birth Registration, supra note 2 at para 88, citing Racine v Woods, 
[1983] 2 SCR 173, [1984] 1 WWR 1 at 187–88 [Racine]. 
96  Ibid [emphasis added].  
97  MM v TB, supra note 1 at paras 97–98. 
98  Walkem, supra note 83 at 31. 
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addition, Professor Annie Bunting wrote that “[p]reserving 
connections between children and their Aboriginal heritage 
may be crucial for communities whose traditions, 
languages, and survival can be at risk after years of removal 
of children from Aboriginal homes.”99 The reasoning in 
M.M. v. T.B. ignores the trauma Indigenous communities 
have endured, and their resulting need to ensure that future 
generations are able to help protect the communities’ 
continued existence. 
 
Despite the efforts of T.B.’s counsel to frame “the 
present case as ‘an opportunity for the Court to right an 
historical wrong’ by refusing to remove [R] from his birth 
family the way so many First Nations children were 
removed from their families and communities and sent to 
residential schools and non-aboriginal homes”, the Court 
of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that “it is neither 
appropriate nor possible for this Court in an adoption 
proceeding to right historical wrongs. [R] is not a symbolic 
figurehead. He is a real little boy.”100 However, all 
adoption proceedings—as well as child welfare 
proceedings—involve real little children. The cases cannot 
and should not undervalue the importance of the colonial 
context. Even if the children are not symbolic figureheads, 
the outcomes in their cases have symbolic meaning to the 
Indigenous communities from which they are too often 
disconnected. 
 
                                                     
99  Annie Bunting, “Complicating Culture in Child Placement Decisions” 
(2004) 16:1 CJWL 137 at 163. 
100  MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 42, citing BC Birth Registration, supra 
note 2 at para 81 [emphasis added]. 






The Court of Appeal did not accept counsel for 
T.B.’s submission that “s[ection] 3(2) should be interpreted 
for the purpose of ensuring ‘substantive equality’ and 
‘amelioration’ of the historical injustices to Indigenous 
peoples”.101 They determined that the provision of the 
Adoption Act does not attract a “super-weight” over the 
other factors, and that the text of the section does not allow 
for an expanded interpretation.102 But as Professor Bunting 
observed, “factors such as stability, bonding, and 
economics have tended to trump a child’s connection to her 
or his cultural heritage”.103 In other words, it is hard for 
Indigenous identity to play as significant a role in the 
assessment of a child’s best interests as the rest of the 
factors listed in the Adoption Act. Moreover, “[t]he weight 
the judge attaches to preserving the child’s Aboriginal 
heritage and culture, along with the relevant factors under 
s[ection] 3(1), is an exercise of discretion based on the 
evidentiary record”.104 As such, “absent a failure to 
consider a relevant factor, failure to give any weight or 
sufficient weight to a relevant factor, or where the decision 
is clearly wrong”, the judge’s decision is entitled to 
substantial deference.105 This means that Indigenous 
mothers who wish to challenge a trial judge’s consideration 
of section 3(2) face an even more difficult battle. 
 
Given that Indigenous communities need greater 
emphasis to be placed on a child’s cultural identity, but 
                                                     
101  MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 96. 
102  Ibid at para 15. 
103  Bunting, supra note 99 at 153. 
104  MM v TB, supra note 1 at para 94 [emphasis added]. 
105  Ibid. 
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courts are unable and unwilling to put more weight on that 
factor when deciding adoption cases, perhaps there should 
be a change to the legislation in British Columbia so that a 
super-weight for Indigenous heritage and cultural identity 
is formally recognized. This would not be a novel idea. As 
the Court of Appeal noted in M.M. v. T.B., “the Nova Scotia 
Legislature did ‘super-weight’ the factor in s[ection] 47(5) 
of the Children and Family Services Act”:106 
 
  Permanent care and custody order107 
 
47  (5)  Where practicable, a child, who is the 
subject  of an order for permanent care and 
custody, shall be placed with a family of the 
child’s own culture, race, religion or 
language but, if such placement is not 
available within a reasonable time, the child 
may be placed in the most suitable home 
available with the approval of the Minister. 
 
This kind of explicit legislative direction could help 
strengthen Indigenous communities, which could, in turn, 
make adoption cases with Indigenous children less 
common. 
 
      However, it is worth noting that T.B., B.B., and the 
Splatsin Band were unable to prevent R’s adoption despite 
the unique legislative advantage that the Splatsin Band 
already has in the realm of Indigenous child welfare. In 
                                                     
106  Ibid at 91. 
107  Children and Family Services Act, SNS 1990, c 5, s 47(5) [emphasis 
added]. 






1980, the Splatsin Band passed A By-law for the Care of 
Our Indian Children: Spallumcheen Indian Band By-law 
#3-1980,108 which “gives to the Band exclusive jurisdiction 
over any proceeding involving the removal of a child from 
their family”.109 The bylaw applies “to all Splatsin . . . 
[children] no matter where they are living, even if they do 
not live on Splatsin reserve”.110 It is recognized by both the 
provincial government and the federal government,111 and 
“[i]t is the only child welfare bylaw which has been 
allowed under s[ection] 81 of the Indian Act”.112 But 
nevertheless, this seemingly powerful resource was 
ultimately ineffective at stopping R’s adoption into a 
family outside of the Splatsin Band. In fact, the bylaw 
receives little mention in either the trial or appeal decisions. 
As seen from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s 
calls to action, there must be greater empowerment and 
respect for Indigenous peoples in every aspect of life—not 
just piecemeal solutions—in order for Indigenous mothers 




This paper did not set out to argue that the outcome in M.M. 
v. T.B. was incorrect. Rather, the purpose has been to 
                                                     
108  A By-law for the Care of Our Indian Children: Spallumcheen Indian 
Band By-law #3-1980, 3 June 1980. 
109  Walkem, supra note 83 at 19. 
110  Splatsin, “Splatsin Stsmamlt Services”, online: 
<www.splatsin.ca/departments/splatsin-stsmamlt-services>. 
111  See M (M), Re, 2013 ABPC 59, 558 AR 136 at paras 86–87 for more 
details about the bylaw. 
112  Walkem, supra note 83 at 19, citing Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5, s 81. 
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explore the analysis in both the trial decision and the appeal 
decision in hopes of uncovering insights about the 
experiences of Indigenous mothers in child welfare and 
adoption proceedings today. Professor Marlee Kline’s 
groundbreaking article on the dominant ideology of 
motherhood served as a springboard for understanding how 
Indigenous women are more vulnerable to being 
characterized as unfit mothers, and more recent scholarship 
confirms that unfortunately Professor Kline’s observations 
about the expectations of mothers are still true. The law has 
not changed dramatically from when she published her 
article. Also, although the courts are paying more attention 
to Indigenous identity when considering a child’s best 
interests, the judgments from M.M. v. T.B. demonstrate 
how the courts’ perspective in this area can lack depth and 
nuance. While there may be acknowledgment of the 
wrongs done to Indigenous peoples in general, individuals’ 
actions and behaviour are still not being understood in 
relation to the broader context of colonial oppression.  
 
In April of 2018, the Ministry of Children and 
Family Development introduced Bill 26: the Child, Family 
and Community Service Amendment Act.113 The aim is to 
ensure that “Indigenous communities will have greater 
involvement in child-welfare decisions to help keep their 
children out of care, safe in their home communities, and 
connected to their cultures”.114 The government’s news 
release states that: 
                                                     
113  Bill 26, Child, Family and Community Service Amendment Act, 3rd 
Sess, 41st Parl, British Columbia, 2018. 
114  Government of British Columbia, “Province proposes changes to 
improve Indigenous child welfare” (24 April 2018), online: 
<https://news.gov.bc.ca/releases/2018CFD0015-000722>. 






If approved by the legislature, the proposed 
changes will allow MCFD to share more 
information with Indigenous communities 
right from the start to keep children from 
coming into care in the first place, and will 
give the ministry more opportunities to work 
collaboratively on planning and caring for 
Indigenous children . . .115 
The news release acknowledges that “[t]he 
proposed changes are an interim step”, and that work on 
“systemic reform and jurisdiction, including consideration 
of [the] United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples . . . and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission Calls to Action”, must continue.116 It remains 
to be seen whether Bill 26 will be effective at improving 
the lives of Indigenous mothers and their children.117 If 
Indigenous communities are to be truly supported so they 
encounter less friction with the court system, the 
government will still need to commit to wide-ranging, 
substantial changes and invest in comprehensive, 
meaningful social programs aimed at addressing the legacy 
of colonialism. 
                                                     
115  Ibid. 
116  Ibid. 
117  The BC Aboriginal Justice Council has already expressed concerns 
about the proposed amendments, stating that the changes “were 
developed unilaterally, with limited opportunities for Indigenous 
comments, rather than meaningful active involvement of Indigenous 
Nations in authoring the legislation”. See: BC Aboriginal Justice 
Council, “Statement from the BC Aboriginal Justice Council on Bill 
26 (2018) Child, Family and Community Service Amendment Act” (26 
April 2018), online: <http://bcajc.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/BCAJC-Bill-C-26-Press-Release-final.pdf>. 
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